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Abstract
We examine global economic dynamics under infinite-horizon learn-
ing in a New Keynesian model in which the interest-rate rule is subject
to the zero lower bound. As in Evans, Guse and Honkapohja (2008),
we find that under normal monetary and fiscal policy the intended
steady state is locally but not globally stable. Unstable deflationary
paths can arise after large pessimistic shocks to expectations. For large
expectation shocks pushing interest rates to the zero lower bound, tem-
porary increases in government spending can be used to insulate the
economy from deflation traps.
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1 Introduction
Following the introduction of inflation targeting and related monetary strate-
gies, target inflation rates seem to have fallen to relatively low levels, about
∗Early versions of this paper were presented at the Norges Bank conference "Inflation
Targeting Twenty Years On," the Conference in honor of Roger Guesnerie, at PSE in
Paris, and at the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank. We are particularly indebted for
comments received from Jess Benhabib, David Cobham, Krisztina Molnar, John Williams,
and Mike Woodford.
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two to three percent in many countries. This implies that large adverse
shocks might push the economy into periods of deflation. This was clearly a
major concern in the US during the 2001 recession. The experiences of 2008
and 2009, as well as the earlier experience of Japan since the 1990s, have
underscored these concerns and created a situation in which the monetary
policy response is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal inter-
est rates, a phenomenon sometimes called a “liquidity trap.” Furthermore,
in a liquidity trap there is the potential for the economy to get stuck in a
deflationary situation with declining or persistently low levels of output.
The theoretical plausibility of the economy becoming trapped in a defla-
tionary state, and the macroeconomic policies that might be able to avoid
or extricate the economy from a liquidity trap, have been examined pre-
dominantly from the rational expectations (RE) perspective. One central
feature of this literature emphasizes the role of commitment. For exam-
ple, Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue that if the
economy encounters a liquidity trap, monetary policy should commit to be-
ing expansionary for a considerable period of time, by keeping interest rates
near zero even after the economy has emerged from deflation. Another is-
sue concerns the possibility of permanent deflation. Under RE this hinges
on the precise form of fiscal policy in the deflationary steady state and on
whether this is consistent with the household’s transversality condition. See
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and
Uribe (2002) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). A further issue is the
impact of the interest rate zero lower bound on the performance of policies
during the transition back to the inflation target.1
In our opinion, the RE assumption is questionable in an episode of de-
flation, which is far away from the inflation target and the normal state of
the economy, and presents a new environment for economic agents. Our
own view, reflected in Evans and Honkapohja (2005) and Evans, Guse, and
Honkapohja (2008), is that the evolution of expectations plays a key role in
the dynamics of the economy and that the tools from learning theory are
needed for a realistic analysis of these issues. As we will see, there is the pos-
sibility of a self-reinforcing feedback loop, in which suﬃciently pessimistic
expectations result in low output and deflation, leading to high real interest
rates because of the zero lower bound, which in results in a downward re-
1See Adam and Billi (2007) and Coenen, Orphanides, and Wieland (2004) for repre-
sentative recent analyses and further references.
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vision of expectations, strengthening the downward pressure on output and
deflation.
More specifically, under learning private agents are assumed to form ex-
pectations using an adaptive forecasting rule, which they update over time
in accordance with standard statistical procedures. The analysis of Evans,
Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) was conducted in a standard New Keynesian
model with sticky prices using the assumption that the decisions of private
agents are based on short-horizon rules. These rules are based on the agents’
Euler equations, specifying the optimal trade-oﬀ between current and antic-
ipated next period decisions. These anticipations in turn are formed using
subjective expectations based on forecasting models that are updated over
time using recursive estimation procedures. This framework, often called
“Euler-equation learning,” yielded important results about formulating ro-
bust policies to combat deflationary outcomes. However, its short decision
horizon means that one cannot study the implications for current behavior
of explicit commitment to future policies. In particular, this learning frame-
work cannot be used to assess the conventional wisdom of the RE literature
that an appropriate policy to combat a deflation episode is a commitment to
low interest rates for a sustained period in the future.
In this paper we replace Euler-equation learning with the assumption that
agents have infinite-horizon decision rules derived from intertemporal opti-
mization under given paths of expectations of aggregate economic variables.
This type of formulation is often called “infinite-horizon learning” and it has
recently been emphasized by Preston (2005) and Preston (2006).2 In gen-
eral, in this setting the individual consumers need to forecast future interest
rates, inflation, income and taxes over the infinite future. As a benchmark,
we also assume in this paper that the consumers are fully Ricardian and in-
corporate the government’s intertemporal budget constraint into their own
lifetime budget constraint. This last assumption means that the consump-
tion function depends on expected future real interest rates and incomes net
of government spending. In this formulation the mix of government financing
does not influence private consumption behavior.
The possibility of deflation traps under a standard forward-looking global
Taylor rule, emerges as a serious concern. Although the targeted steady state
2The formulation has earlier been used in Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans,
Honkapohja, and Romer (1998). Other recent papers include Evans, Honkapohja, and
Mitra (2009) and Eusepi and Preston (2007).
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is locally stable under learning, a large pessimistic shock to expectations can
result, under learning, in a self-reinforcing deflationary process accompanied
by declining output. Our results under learning are in stark contrast to what
is possible under RE. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) showed
that under perfect foresight, in addition to the targeted steady state, there are
nonlinear paths that converge to an unintended low-inflation steady state.3
Thus the learning dynamics under standard monetary and fiscal policy are
even more disturbing than those under RE.
We next consider monetary and fiscal policies that have been suggested
to combat the possibility of deflation. One case is aggressive monetary eas-
ing in which the Taylor rule is overridden by dropping the interest rate to
(very near) zero whenever expected inflation falls below a specified thresh-
old. In our infinite-horizon set-up agents are assumed to understand that
this aggressive policy will be in place throughout the future. Strikingly, this
policy, although it does oﬀer some protection, is not suﬃcient to eliminate
the possibility of deflation traps if the negative expectations shock is very
large. In fact, even if the monetary authorities commit to zero interest rates
forever, regardless of the state of the economy, the possibility of a deflation
trap remains (although the likelihood is reduced).
These results raise the question of whether there exists a policy that en-
sures that the economy will never get trapped into a deflationary process and
will converge to the targeted steady state. We focus on the policy recom-
mended in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008). Under this policy aggressive
monetary easing is augmented by aggressive fiscal easing when required to
keep inflation at or above the threshold. This policy always eliminates the
possibility of deflationary spirals and ensures global stability of the targeted
steady state.
2 The Model
We start with the same economic framework as in Evans, Guse, and Honkapo-
hja (2008). There is a continuum of household-firms, which produce a dif-
ferentiated consumption good under monopolistic competition and price-
adjustment costs. There is also a government which uses both monetary
and fiscal policy and can issue public debt as described below.
3The low steady state can either be one of low positive inflation or deflation, depending
on the details of the interest rate rule.
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The objective for agent s is to maximize expected, discounted utility
subject to a standard flow budget constraint:
Max E0
∞X
t=0
βtUt,s
µ
ct,s,
Mt−1,s
Pt
, ht,s,
Pt,s
Pt−1,s
− 1
¶
(1)
st. ct,s +mt,s + bt,s +Υt,s = mt−1,sπ−1t +Rt−1π−1t bt−1,s +
Pt,s
Pt
yt,s, (2)
where ct,s is the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregator, Mt,s and mt,s denote
nominal and real money balances, ht,s is the labor input into production,
bt,s denotes the real quantity of risk-free one-period nominal bonds held by
the agent at the end of period t, Υt,s is the lump-sum tax collected by the
government, Rt−1 is the nominal interest rate factor between periods t−1 and
t, Pt,s is the price of consumption good s, yt,s is output of good s, Pt is the
aggregate price level and the inflation rate is πt = Pt/Pt−1. The subjective
discount factor is denoted by β. The utility function has the parametric form
Ut,s =
c1−σ1t,s
1− σ1
+
χ
1− σ2
µ
Mt−1,s
Pt
¶1−σ2
−
h1+εt,s
1 + ε
− γ
2
µ
Pt,s
Pt−1,s
− 1
¶2
,
where σ1, σ2, ε, γ > 0. The final term parameterizes the cost of adjusting
prices in the spirit of Rotemberg (1982).4 The household decision problem
is also subject to the usual “no Ponzi game” condition.
Production function for good s is given by
yt,s = hαt,s
where 0 < α < 1. Output is diﬀerentiated and firms operate under monopo-
listic competition. Each firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve given
by
Pt,s =
µ
yt,s
Yt
¶−1/ν
Pt. (3)
Here Pt,s is the profit maximizing price set by firm s consistent with its
production yt,s. The parameter ν is the elasticity of substitution between
two goods and is assumed to be greater than one. Yt is aggregate output,
which is exogenous to the firm.
4We use the Rotemberg formulation in preference to the Calvo model of price stickiness
because it enables us to study global dynamics in the nonlinear system. The linearizations
at the targeted steady state are identical for the two approaches.
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The government’s flow budget constraint is
bt +mt +Υt = gt +mt−1π−1t +Rt−1π−1t bt−1, (4)
where gt denotes government consumption of the aggregate good, bt is the
real quantity of government debt, and Υt is the real lump-sum tax collected.
We assume that fiscal policy follows a linear tax rule for lump-sum taxes as
in Leeper (1991)
Υt = κ0 + κbt−1 + ηt, (5)
where ηt is a white noise shock and where β
−1−1 < κ < 1. The restriction on
κ means that fiscal policy is “passive” in the terminology of Leeper (1991),
and implies that an increase in real government debt leads to an increase
in taxes suﬃcient to cover the increased interest and at least some fraction
of the increased principal. In a companion paper we plan to investigate the
implications of “active” fiscal policy in which 0 ≤ κ < β−1 − 1.
We assume that gt is stochastic
gt = g¯ + ut, (6)
where ut is an observable stationary AR(1) mean zero shock. From market
clearing we have
ct + gt = yt (7)
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a global interest rate rule
Rt − 1 = θtf
¡
πet+1
¢
. (8)
The function f(π) is taken to be positive and non-decreasing, while θt is an
exogenous, observable stationary AR(1) positive random shock with mean
1 representing random shifts in the behavior of the monetary policy-maker.
The rule (8) is a nonlinear forward-looking Taylor rule, in which dependence
on output expectations is suppressed for simplicity.5 We assume the existence
of π∗, R∗ such that R∗ = β−1π∗ and f(π∗) = R∗− 1. π∗ can be viewed as the
inflation target of the Central Bank, and we will assume that π∗ ≥ 1. In the
numerical analysis we will use the functional form
f(π) = (R∗ − 1)
³ π
π∗
´AR∗/(R∗−1)
,
5The main results below would also hold in the case of a contemporaneous-data Taylor
rule, which is used in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008).
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which implies the existence of a nonstochastic steady state at π∗. Note that
f 0(π∗) = AR∗, which we assume is bigger than β−1. Equations (4), (5) and
(8) constitute “normal policy”.
2.1 Optimal decisions for private sector
As in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008), the first-order conditions for an
optimum yield
0 = −hεt,s +
αγ
ν
(πt,s − 1)πt,s
1
ht,s
(9)
+α
µ
1− 1
ν
¶
Y 1/νt
y(1−1/ν)t,s
ht,s
c−σ1t,s −
αγβ
ν
1
ht,s
Et,s(πt+1,s − 1)πt+1,s.
c−σ1t,s = βRtEt,s
¡
π−1t+1c
−σ1
t+1,s
¢
and
mt,s = (χβ)
1/σ2
Ã¡
1−R−1t
¢
c−σ1t,s
Et,sπσ2−1t+1
!−1/σ2
,
where πt+1,s = Pt+1,s/Pt,s. We now make use of the representative agent
assumption. In the representative-agent economy all agents s have the same
utility functions, initial money and debt holdings and prices. We assume
also that they make the same forecasts Et,sct+1,s Et,sπt+1,s, Et,sπt+1, as well
as forecasts of other variables that will become relevant below. Under these
assumptions all agents make the same decisions at each point in time, so that
ht,s = ht, yt,s = yt, ct,s = ct and πt,s = πt, and all agents make the same
forecasts. Imposing also the equilibrium condition Yt = yt = hαt , one obtains
the equations
αγ
ν
(πt − 1)πt = ht
µ
hεt − α
µ
1− 1
ν
¶
hα−1t c
−σ1
t
¶
+ β
αγ
ν
Et [(πt+1 − 1)πt+1] ,
c−σ1t = βRtEt
¡
π−1t+1c
−σ1
t+1
¢
,
mt = (χβ)
1/σ2
Ã¡
1−R−1t
¢
c−σ1t
Etπσ2−1t+1
!−1/σ2
,
For convenience, we make the assumptions σ1 = σ2 = 1, i.e. utility of
consumption and of money is logarithmic. It is also assumed that agents
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have point expectations, so that their decisions depend only on the mean
of their subjective forecasts. This is a satisfactory assumption provided the
shocks are suﬃciently small. This allows us to write the system as
mt = χβ(1−R−1t )−1ct, (10)
c−1t = βr
e
t+1(c
e
t+1)
−1, where ret+1 = Rt/π
e
t+1, and (11)
αγ
ν
(πt − 1) πt = ht
µ
hεt − α
µ
1− 1
ν
¶
hα−1t c
−1
t
¶
+ β
αγ
ν
£¡
πet+1 − 1
¢
πet+1
¤
.
(12)
Equation (12) is the nonlinear New Keynesian Phillips curve, which describes
the optimal price-setting by firms. The term (πt − 1)πt arises from the
quadratic form of the adjustment costs, and this expression is increasing
in πt over the allowable range πt ≥ 1/2. To interpret this equation, note
that the bracketed expression in the first term on the right-hand side is the
diﬀerence between the marginal disutility of labor and the product of the
marginal revenue from an extra unit of labor with the marginal utility of
consumption. The terms involving current and future inflation arise from
the price-adjustment costs resulting from marginal variations in labor sup-
ply. Equation (11) is the standard Euler equation giving the intertemporal
first-order condition for the consumption path. Equation (10) is the money
demand function resulting from the presence of real balances in the utility
function. Note that for our parameterization, the demand for real balances
becomes infinite as Rt → 1.
We now proceed to rewrite the decision rules for ct and πt so that they
depend on forecasts of key variables over the infinite horizon.
2.2 The infinite-horizon Phillips curve
We start with an infinite-horizon version of the Phillips curve (12). Let
Qt = (πt − 1)πt. (13)
The appropriate root for given Q is π ≥ 1
2
and so we need to impose Q ≥
−1
4
to have a meaningful model. Making use of the aggregate relationships
ht = y
1/α
t and ct = yt − gt we can rewrite (12) as
Qt =
ν
αγ
y(1+ε)/αt −
ν − 1
γ
yαt (yt − gt)−1 + βQet+1.
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Solving this forward we obtain
Qt =
ν
γ
∞X
j=0
α−1βj
¡
yet+j
¢(1+ε)/α − ν − 1
γ
∞X
j=0
βj
µ
yet+j
xet+j
¶
. (14)
Here xet+j denotes expected net output, which equals expectations of yt+j −
gt+j. The expectations are formed at time t and variables at time t are
assumed to be in the information set of the agents. We will treat (14),
together with (13), as the temporary equilibrium equations that determine
πt, given expectations {yet+j, xet+j}∞j=1.
In the Phillip’s curve relationship (14) one might wonder why inflation
does not also depend directly on the expected future aggregate inflation rate.6
Equation (9) is obtained from the first-order conditions using (3) to eliminate
relative prices. Because of the representative agent assumption, each firm’s
output equals average output in every period. Since firms can be assumed
to have learned this is the case, we obtain (14). An alternative procedure
would be to start from (9), iterate it forward and use the demand function
to write the third term on the right-hand side of (9) in terms of the relative
price. This would lead to a modification of (14) in which future relative prices
also appear, but using the representative agent assumption, the relative price
term would drop out.
2.3 The consumption function
To derive the consumption function from (11) we use the flow budget con-
straint and the NPG (no Ponzi game) to obtain an intertemporal budget
constraint. Write
bt = rtbt−1 + Φt,
where rt = Rt−1/πt and
Φt = yt +mt−1π−1t − ct −mt −Υt. (15)
Note that we assume (Pjt/Pt)yjt = yt, i.e. the representative agent assump-
tion is being invoked. Iterating (15) forward and imposing
lim
j→∞
(Det,t+j)
−1bt+j = 0, (16)
6There is an indirect eﬀect of expected inflation on current inflation via current output.
9
we obtain the life-time budget constraint of the household
0 = rtbt−1 + Φt +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j)
−1Φet+j, (17)
where
Det,t+j =
jY
i=1
ret+i,
with ret+j = Rt+j−1/πet+j and
Φet+j = yet+j +met+j−1(πet+j)−1 − cet+j −met+j −Υet+j. (18)
Here all expectations are formed in period t, which is indicated in the notation
for Det,t+j but is omitted from the other expectational variables.
The consumption Euler equation (11) implies that
cet+j = ctβ
jDet,t+j.
Substituting this expression for cet+j in (18) it follows that
0 = rtbt−1 −
∞X
j=0
ctβj + φt +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j)
−1φet+j, (19)
where
φt = yt +mt−1π
−1
t −mt −Υt,
φet+j = y
e
t+j +m
e
t+j−1(π
e
t+j)
−1 −met+j −Υet+j.
A crucial issue is how households form expectations of future taxes. In
this paper we make the strong Ricardian equivalence assumption that house-
holds understand that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint will
be satisfied.7 First, write down the latter constraint. From (4) one has
bt +mt +Υt = gt +mt−1π−1t + rtbt−1 or
bt = ∆t + rtbt−1 where
∆t = gt −Υt −mt +mt−1π−1t .
7Relaxing this assumption would be of interest. This would require agents to forecast
future taxes and the evolution of public debt. For a simple example of this approach see
Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009).
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By forward substitution, and assuming limT→∞Dt,t+T bt+T = 0,
0 = rtbt−1 +∆t +
∞X
j=1
D−1t,t+j∆t+j. (20)
Note that ∆t+j is the primary government deficit in t+ j, measured as gov-
ernment purchases less lump-sum taxes and less seigniorage. Under the Ri-
cardian Equivalence assumption, we assume that agents at each time t expect
this constraint to be satisfied, i.e.
0 = rtbt−1 +∆t +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j)
−1∆et+j, where
∆et+j = get+j −Υet+j −met+j +met+j−1(πet+j)−1 for j = 1, 2, 3, . . . .
Substituting out rtbt−1 from (19) and rearranging we get
(1− β)−1ct = (φt −∆t) +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j)
−1 ¡φet+j −∆et+j¢ ,
or
ct = (1− β)
Ã
yt − gt +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j)
−1xet+j
!
. (21)
Equation (21) is viewed as the temporary equilibrium equation that, under
Ricardian Equivalence, determines consumption, given expectations. In the
inflation equation (14) it is assumed that households form {xet+j}∞j=1 and
{yet+j}∞j=1 using an adaptive learning rule that treats these aggregates as an
exogenously given process. For the consumption function (21) one needs also
to specify how private agents form the discount factors Det,t+j =
Yj
i=1
ret+i.
Various assumptions are natural, but we will focus on the assumption that
ret+i is obtained from separate forecasts of inflation and interest rates, making
use of the monetary policy rule to forecast the latter. Thus, monetary policy
is both transparent and credible in that agents incorporate the interest rate
rule in their expectations formation for all future periods.8 In this case,
8Alternatively, if the policy rule is not known to the agents, one could assume that
agents forecast future real interest rates directly using an adaptive learning rule. The
local stability results given below would continue to hold.
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combining ret+j(t) = Ret+j−1/πet+j and Rt = 1 + f
¡
πet+1
¢
one obtains
Det,t+j =
jY
i=1
(1 + f(πet+j))/π
e
t+j. (22)
We remark that our consumption function (21) exhibits Ricardian Equiv-
alence in the following sense:
Proposition 1 Household consumption depends on the sequence of expected
government spending but not in any way on how it is financed.
This temporary equilibrium result for arbitrary subjective expectations
generalizes the results ofWallace (1981) and Eggertsson andWoodford (2003),
which presume that the RE hypothesis holds. The assumption of Ricardian
consumers has, in particular, the implication that an open-market opera-
tion altering the initial composition of wealth between money and bonds has
no eﬀect on consumption, given subsequent interest rate policy and the se-
quence of government spending. In addition, the standard result about the
neutrality of changes in lump-sum taxes holds in our setting.
3 Learning and Stability of Steady States
Consider first the steady states of the model. These are found by setting
the random shocks to zero and setting πet+j = πt = π, yet+j = yt = y, and
xet+j = yet+j − g¯ = y − g¯. For any steady state π, equation (11) implies that
the nominal interest rate factor satisfies the Fisher equation
R = β−1π. (23)
As emphasized by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001), because f(.)
is nonnegative, continuous (and diﬀerentiable) and has a steady state π∗ with
f 0(π∗) > β−1, there must be a second steady state πL < π∗ with f 0(πL) <
β−1. For our parametrization of f(·), there are no steady states other than
the intended steady state π∗ and the unintended low-inflation steady state
πL. Figure 1 illustrates the two steady states resulting from the global Taylor
rule subject to the zero lower bound on net interest rates.9
9We remark that it follows from Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) and Evans,
Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) that π∗ is locally determinate and πL is locally indeterminate
under RE.
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Rπ
π/β
1
π*π L
1 + f(π)
Policy rule for R
Fisher equation
Figure 1: Multiple steady states under normal policy.
The other steady-state equations are given by
c = hα − g¯, (24)
−h1+ε + αγ
ν
(1− β) (π − 1)π + α
µ
1− 1
ν
¶
hαc−1 = 0 (25)
and a steady-state version of (10). It is shown in the Appendix of Evans,
Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) that in most cases there is a corresponding
unique interior steady state c > 0 and h > 0.
The starting point in the learning approach to expectations formation is
that economic agents have very limited knowledge about the structure of the
economy, so that they do not have RE and instead make inference about the
relevant parts of the economy that they need for forecasting. The agents make
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forecasts using a reduced-form econometric model of the relevant variables
and using parameters that are estimated using past data. The forecasts are
input to agent’s decision rules and in each period the economy attains a
temporary equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium for the current period variables
given the forecasts of the agents. See e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
Sargent (2008) and Evans and Honkapohja (2009) for general discussions of
adaptive learning.
The temporary equilibrium provides a new data point, which in the next
period leads to re-estimation of the parameters and updating of the forecasts
and, in turn, to a new temporary equilibrium. The sequence of temporary
equilibria may generate parameter estimates that converge to a fixed point
corresponding to an RE equilibrium for the economy. When the convergence
takes place, we say that the RE equilibrium is stable under learning. In
the general formulation of the model given above, it was assumed that the
economy is subject to stationary autoregressive random shocks. If these
exogenous shocks are observable, then agents would naturally include them in
their forecasting model, and the coeﬃcients of the model would be estimated
and updated by an econometric technique such as recursive least squares. If
the exogenous shocks are iid then they provide no information about their
future values and thus would be excluded from the forecasting model. In
this case agents would simply estimate the intercept for each variable. If
these estimates converge over time to fixed values, the limit corresponds to a
RE stochastic steady state. In the current model there are two possible RE
stochastic steady states. When the random shocks are small these are close
to the nonstochastic steady states discussed above.
The simple set-up just described, in which only intercepts are estimated, is
referred to as “steady-state learning.” More specifically, steady-state learning
with point expectations is formalized as
yet+j = y
e
t and π
e
t+j = π
e
t for all j ≥ 1.
and
zet = z
e
t−1 + ωt(zt−1 − zet−1) (26)
for z = y, π. Here ωt is called the “gain sequence,” and measures the extent
of adjustment of estimates to the most recent forecast error. In stochastic
systems one often sets ωt = t−1 and this “decreasing gain” learning corre-
sponds to least-squares updating. Also widely used is the case ωt = ω, for
0 < ω ≤ 1, called “constant gain” learning. In this case it is usually assumed
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that ω is small. Stability of the steady states is examined below using the
simple learning rules just described. Thus the exogenous random shocks are
assumed to be iid. This is merely a simplification since it can be shown that
the stability of the steady states is governed by the stability of the estimates
of the intercepts. Furthermore, it can also be shown that provided the iid
shocks are suﬃciently small, the stability properties of steady states are the
same as for the corresponding nonstochastic system. Thus, for simplicity,
in what follows the exogenous shocks θt, ut, ηt are assumed to be constants,
equal to their respective mean values, and we study steady state learning
within the nonstochastic system.
3.1 Temporary equilibrium
Collecting the preceding, the following equations define the temporary equi-
librium under normal policy.
1) Phillips curve
Qt =
ν
γ
∞X
j=0
α−1βj
¡
yet+j
¢(1+ε)/α − ν − 1
γ
∞X
j=0
βj
µ
yet+j
yet+j − g¯
¶
,
Qt = (πt − 1)πt.
2) Consumption function
ct = (1− β)
Ã
yt − gt +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j)
−1(yet+j − g¯)
!
,
Det,t+j =
jY
i=1
(1 + f(πet+i))/π
e
t+i.
3) Money demand
mt = χβ(1−R−1t )−1ct.
4) Government budget constraint
bt +mt + κ0 + κbt−1 = g¯ +mt−1π−1t +Rt−1π
−1
t bt−1.
5) The interest-rate rule
Rt − 1 = f
¡
πet+1
¢
,
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where
f(π) = (R∗ − 1)
³ π
π∗
´AR∗/(R∗−1)
.
6) Market clearing
yt = ct + g¯.
Given expectations {yet+j, πet+j}∞j=1, the above six equations define the
temporary equilibrium in ct, πt, yt, Rt,mt, bt. The model dynamics are then
completed by specifying the evolution of expectations over time in accordance
with the learning rules described above. The dynamics under learning can
be conveniently described by using the close connection between the possible
convergence of least-squares learning to an RE equilibrium and a stability
condition, known as E-stability. E-stability of an equilibrium is based on a
mapping from the perceived law of motion that private agents are estimating
and using to make forecasts to the implied actual law of motion generating the
data (i.e. the temporary equilibrium) under these perceptions. E-stability
is defined in terms of local stability, at an RE equilibrium, of a diﬀerential
equation based on this map. For a general discussion of adaptive learning
and the E-stability principle see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
Before turning to the E-stability results, we briefly discuss the issue of the
transversality conditions in our temporary equilibrium set-up. Under steady-
state learning, πet+j = πet for all j ≥ 1 implies Det,t+j = ((1 + f(πet))/πet)
j =
(ret )
j , where ret = (1+ f(πet))/πet is the expected real interest factor, and the
consumption function takes the form
ct = (1− β)
µ
yt − g¯ +
1
ret − 1
(yet − g¯)
¶
. (27)
provided ret > 1.10 The consumption function gives the time t choice of
consumption based on information and forecasts at time t, and can be viewed
as the first step of an infinite-horizon dynamic plan. From the consumption
Euler equation it follows that the expected path of future consumption (with
σ1 = 1) is given by
c−1t+j = (r
e
t )
−jβ−jc−1t , for j = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
where here c−1t+j is the expected marginal utility of money at t + j. The
relevant transversality condition for the household is that
lim
j→∞
c−1t+jβ
jbt+j = 0 (28)
10See the discussion below for our treatment of the case ret ≤ 1.
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holds along the planned path of consumption and bonds. Because the con-
sumption function is derived using the intertemporal budget constraint ob-
tained using the NPG condition, we know that the condition
lim
j→∞
(Det,t+j)
−1bt+j = lim
j→∞
(ret )
−jbt+j = 0
is satisfied. Since, using the consumption Euler equation, we have c−1t+jβ
jbt+j =
(ret )−jc
−1
t bt+j, it follows that (28) is satisfied along the planned path.11 Thus,
at each point in time, the transversality condition is met for the households’
planned path of consumption and wealth.
3.2 E-Stability
The theoretical results for learning below are based on E-stability analysis
of the system under the learning rules (26). It can be shown that a steady
state is locally stable under learning for decreasing or small constant gains if
and only if it is E-stable.12 The definition of E-stability for the case at hand
is given below.
We now proceed to the analysis of E-stability of the two possible steady
states when the global interest rate rule (8) describes monetary policy. Using
(27) and market clearing,
yt = g¯ + (β−1 − 1)(yet − g¯)
µ
πet
1 + f(πet)− πet
¶
(29)
≡ G1(yet , πet).
Temporary equilibrium is given by equations (29) and
πt = Q−1[K(G1(yet , π
e
t), y
e
t )] ≡ G2(yet , πet),
11Using the money demand equation it follows that limj→∞m−1t+jβ
jbt+j = 0 also holds
along the planned path.
12See Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Evans and Honkapohja (2009) for general discus-
sions of E-stability. Sections 3.3-3.4, 7.2 and chapter 11 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001)
discuss the special case of steady-state learning.
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where
Q(πt) ≡ (πt − 1)πt (30)
K(yt, yet ) ≡
ν
γ
µ
α−1y(1+ε)/αt −
¡
1− ν−1
¢ yt
(yt − g¯)
¶
(31)
+
ν
γ
µ
β(1− β)−1
µ
α−1(yet )
(1+ε)/α −
¡
1− ν−1
¢ yet
(yet − g¯)
¶¶
.
The E-stability equations are
dye
dτ
= G1(ye, πe)− ye (32)
dπe
dτ
= G2(ye, πe)− πe.
By construction, the steady states are fixed points of this system of diﬀer-
ential equations. A steady state is said to be E-stable if it is locally stable
under (32). The diﬀerential equations operate in “notional” or “virtual”
time. It can be shown that for large values of the (discrete) real time t,
the continuous time paths (ye(τ), πe(τ)) of (32) are approximately related to
the discrete-time trajectories (yet , πet) of (26) at specific points of real time:
(ye(tn), πe(tn)) ≈ (yen, πen) for tn =
nX
i=1
ωi.
To examine local stability of a steady state (π¯, y¯), one calculates the
Jacobian
DGI =
µ
DyeG1 − 1 DπeG1
DyeG2 DπeG2 − 1
¶
.
Starting with function G2, take diﬀerentials
DyeG2 = (Q−1)0(KyDyeG1 +Kye) > 0
DπeG2 = (Q−1)0KyDπeG1.
The various derivatives at a steady state are:
(Q−1)0 =
1
2π¯ − 1 > 0,
Ky =
ν
γ
µ
(1 + ε)y
1+ε+α
α + (1− ν−1) g¯
(y − g¯)2
¶
> 0,
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Kye =
ν
γ
β
1− β
³
(1 + ε)y
1+ε+α
α + (1− ν−1
´ g¯
(y − g¯)2 ) > 0.
One also needs to compute the following partial derivatives at a steady state:
DyeG1 = (β−1 − 1)
µ
π¯
1 + f(π¯)− π¯
¶
= 1,
DπeG1 = (β−1 − 1)(y¯ − g¯)
µ
1 + f(π¯)− π¯f 0(π¯)
(1 + f(π¯)− π¯)2
¶
.
Here 1+f(π¯)− π¯f 0(π¯) = (β−1−f 0(π¯))π¯, which is negative at π∗ and positive
at πL. Thus,
DπeG1 < 0 at π∗ and > 0 at πL.
For the sign of DπeG2 we have
sgn[DπeG2] = sgn[DπeG1].
It follows that the Jacobian at the normal steady state π∗ is
DGI =
µ
0 −
+ −
¶
,
implying E-stability of π∗. At the low-inflation steady state πL the Jacobian
is
DGI =
µ
0 +
+ ?
¶
.
The (2, 2) element is DπeG2 − 1 and for suﬃciently small γ DπeG2 becomes
large (see the expression for Ky), so the element is positive for small γ which
implies E-instability of πL.
Collecting the results:
Proposition 2 The model with normal policy has two steady state states π∗
and πL. Under infinite-horizon decision rules with steady-state learning the
targeted steady state π∗ is locally stable under learning. For γ suﬃciently
small the low-inflation steady state is locally unstable taking the form of a
saddle point.
For global results we turn to numerical analysis. One technical issue has
to be taken care of in connection with steady state learning by households.
With arbitrary value of inflation expectations, there are regions of the space
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of expectations in which the expected real interest rate and thus 1+f(πet)−πet
can be negative. This would imply infinite consumption in the preceding
formula for the consumption function. To avoid this diﬃculty, truncate the
steady-state expectations of the household at some long but finite horizon
T and postulate that beyond the horizon, agents just assume that real rate
of interest has reached its steady state value β−1. With this assumption the
consumption function becomes
ct = (1− β)
"
yt − g¯ + (yet − g¯)
"
πet(1− (
πet
1+f(πet )
)T )
1 + f(πet)− πet
+
βT
β−1 − 1
##
and so
yt = g¯ + (β−1 − 1)(yet − g¯)
"
πet(1− (
πet
1+f(πet )
)T )
1 + f(πet)− πet
+
βT
β−1 − 1
#
.
In the global analysis one must also make sure that π ≥ 1/2. This is achieved
in the numerics by setting π = 1/2 if the other temporary equilibrium equa-
tions would imply Q < −1
4
.
Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical results in Proposition 2. The parameter
values A = 2.5, π∗ = 1.02, β = 0.99, α = 0.75, β = 20, ν = 1.5, ε = 1,
R∗ = π∗/β, g¯ = 0.1 and T = 50 are used. The figure shows the phase
diagram of the system (32) for the evolution of expectations under learning.
Given expectations dynamics, it is easy to compute the trajectories of actual
inflation and output.
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Figure 2: E-stability dynamics under global Taylor rule
Figure 2 shows the global E-stability dynamics that provide an approx-
imation to the real-time dynamics of learning. Examining the aggregate
demand equation (29), it is seen that the locus consisting of the two verti-
cal lines gives values for (πe, ye) at which dy
e
dτ = 0, while the upward-sloping
curve gives values for (πe, ye) at which dπ
e
dτ = 0. The targeted steady state
at π∗ = 1.02 is locally stable under E-stability dynamics and convergence
toward it is cyclical. The low steady state πL = 0.993092, yL = 0.633614 is a
saddle point and, most importantly, there is a region of initial expectations
implying unstable trajectories with falling inflation expectations and eventu-
ally falling output expectations. The same holds true for actual inflation and
output. We call these paths deflationary spirals and this region the defla-
tionary trap. The downward-sloping line through the low steady state gives
the local linear approximation of the stable manifold separating the basin of
attraction of the targeted steady state from the deflationary region.
Figure 2 shows that the problem of deflationary traps for suﬃciently
pessimistic expectations, discovered in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008)
for Euler equation learning, continues to arise under infinite-horizon learning,
in which consumption, output and inflation are determined as the first-period
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decisions of the solution to the infinite-horizon optimization problem under
subjective expectations based on our learning rule. The intuition for the
unstable trajectories is that suﬃciently pessimistic expectations πet , yet lead
to high expected real interest rates, because of the zero lower bound on net
nominal interest rates. High expected real interest rates and low expected
incomes, imply lower inflation and output through the consumption function
and the infinite-horizon Phillips curve. The learning rule can then lead to a
downward revision of expectations over time, pushing the economy further
along an unstable trajectory. Of course, along an unstable path one would
expect either private agents or policymakers eventually to alter their actions,
but our results nonetheless indicate the potential for major disruptions to
the economy resulting from large negative shocks to expectations. We now
turn to possible policy changes that can avoid these undesirable outcomes.
4 Alternative Monetary and Fiscal Policies
4.1 Monetary Policy Committing to Low Interest Rates
In earlier work with Eran Guse, published as Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja
(2008), we considered the implications of aggressive monetary easing trig-
gered by inflation rates below some threshold π˜, where πL < π˜ < π∗. That
paper studied Euler-equation learning in which agents have short horizons,
and it was found that this type of policy did not provide a fool-proof way to
avoid deflationary spirals. In the current framework agents have long hori-
zons in their decision-making, so that there appears to be more scope for
aggressive monetary policy to eliminate these unstable trajectories. Further-
more, in models with RE commitment to long periods of low interest rates
has been advocated as a way to avoid the consequences of liquidity traps,
see e.g. Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and Svensson
(2003).
We modify the interest rate rule to include aggressive monetary easing
if expected inflation gets too low. This idea is formalized by introducing a
lower threshold for inflation, so that the interest rate Rt is cut to a low level
Rˆ very close to one. To maintain continuity of the interest rate rule, one
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introduces two threshold values πL < π˜1 < π˜2 < π∗ with π˜1 ≈ π˜2 and
f˜(πe) = R− 1 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
f(πe) if πe > π˜2
Rˆ+ (πe − π˜1)f(π˜2)−Rˆπ˜2−π˜1 if π˜1 ≤ π
e ≤ π˜2
Rˆ if πe < π˜1
(33)
so that f(πe) in the earlier rule (8) is replaced by f˜(πe).
Figure 3 illustrates the expectation dynamics with aggressive monetary
easing. The numerics set π˜1 = 1.009 and π˜2 = 1.01, so that the interest rate
is adjusted linearly down to R = 1.001 ≡ Rˆ. The other parameter values
are unchanged. It is evident that the possibility of deflationary spirals re-
mains. The new policy does help a little bit because it shifts the unstable
region south-west, as is evident from comparing Figures 2 and 3. The con-
strained low steady-state values in Figure 3 are πL = 0.99099, yL = 0.633459,
which are lower than the values of the low-inflation steady state in Figure 2.
Our main point is that adding aggressive monetary easing at low (expected)
inflation rates is not suﬃcient to eliminate the region of deflation traps.
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Figure 3: Global expectations dynamics with aggressive monetary easing
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In Figure 3 it is assumed that agents have incorporated the interest rate
rule in their consumption function and thus they are assumed to know that
aggressive monetary easing will be continued as long as inflation expectations
remain low. We now take up the possibility that the central bank commits
to zero interest rates for an extended period of time that continues even if
inflation expectations increase toward the targeted value. This is investigated
in our learning setup by considering the limit case in which policy makers
respond to low inflation by committing to the zero interest-rate policy forever.
Surprisingly, the possibility of deflation traps remains even in this extreme
case of monetary easing forever. This result is illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Dynamics with aggressive monetary easing forever
It can be seen that, for suﬃciently pessimistic expectations, the region of
deflation traps continues to exist. This policy reduces the deflationary region
somewhat but at the great cost of converting the previous region of stability
into a regime in which inflation would increase without bound.
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4.2 Combined Monetary and Fiscal Easing
We now add aggressive fiscal policy to the preceding monetary easing policy,
following Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008). The key idea is to tem-
porarily increase government spending to ensure that inflation never falls
below a suitable threshold. With changes in government spending, agents
now have to forecast both gross and net output, which implies that the ex-
pectation dynamics become three-dimensional and phase diagrams cannot
be conveniently used to illustrate the dynamics. Instead, selected time paths
of central variables are plotted in the next two figures. The formal changes
to the model are as follows.
First, assume that expectations of net output are determined by steady-
state learning as was earlier done for output and inflation. Thus, in addition
to (26) the expectation dynamics for xet are given by
xet = x
e
t−1 + ωt(xt−1 − xet−1).
The temporary equilibrium equations are now given by the following. Gross
output is13
yt = gt + (β−1 − 1)xet
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j)
−1, (34)
Det,t+j = [(1 + f˜(π
e
t))/π
e
t ]
j. (35)
Net output is given by
xt = yt − gt. (36)
Evidently, for given expectations net output is independent of gt, so that in
temporary equilibrium the government spending multiplier is one. Inflation
is determined by
Q(πt) ≡ (πt − 1)πt (37)
Q(πt) =
ν
γ
µ
α−1y(1+ε)/αt −
¡
1− ν−1
¢ yt
xt
¶
(38)
+
ν
γ
µ
β(1− β)−1
µ
α−1(yet )
(1+ε)/α −
¡
1− ν−1
¢ yet
xet
¶¶
.
13It should be noted that this equation holds only if (1 + f˜(πet ))/πet > 1 and this issue
was dealt with by the truncation of the consumption function in the numerical analysis as
explained earlier.
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These equations are a generalization of (30)-(31).14
The policy of fiscal easing is begun as triggered by actual inflation threat-
ening to fall below the threshold π˜1 specified in the modification to the in-
terest rate rule in equation (33) in the preceding section. Specifically, it is
assumed that if πt < π˜1 at gt = g¯ then government spending is increased to
whatever level is needed to ensure πt = π˜1. This is feasible because of the
following Lemma:
Lemma 3 For given expectations πet , yet , xet ,
dπt
dgt
≥ k
for some k > 0 and gt suﬃciently large.
Proof. As net output is constant, we have dytdgt = 1. Then, it is seen from
(37)-(38) that ∂Q∂yt is bounded above zero for yt suﬃciently large and so the
same holds for ∂πt∂yt .
The Lemma implies that under our policy of combined fiscal and mone-
tary easing triggered by the inflation threshold, inflation will never fall below
π˜1. We remark that this result holds regardless of the elasticity of labor
supply, which is parameterized by ε > 0. If ε is large, so that labor supply
is highly inelastic, then the sensitivity of inflation to output in the Phillips
curve is correspondingly higher.
The lemma implies the following global uniqueness result:
Proposition 4 Consider the temporary equilibrium system (33), (34), (35),
(36), (37) and (38) with fiscal easing triggered by the threshold π˜1. There
is a unique steady state with inflation at π∗ and a corresponding value for
output, with gt = g¯. The targeted steady state is locally stable under learning.
Proof. From (34)-(35) in a steady state we obtain the Fisher equation
R = β−1π. The interest rate rule provides a second steady-state relationship
R = 1+f˜(π). These equations have a unique solution at π∗under the specified
policy since the policy implies the restriction π ≥ π˜1. Local stability under
learning follows from Proposition 2.
14As mentioned earlier, these equations hold provided that Q(πt) > −14 and in this case
πt is taken as the upper root of the quadratic. For Q(πt) ≤ −14 we set πt =
1
2 .
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The numerical results indicate that the steady state is globally stable under
learning.
The results are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. Consider a starting point
πe = 0.995, ye = 0.62 and xe = 0.52, which is picked from the deflationary
region in Figure 3. Figure 5 shows the time paths for expectations of inflation,
output and net output. The ordering of the times from top to bottom is πe,
ye and xe. While there are initial fluctuations in these expectations, the time
paths converge to the targeted steady state over time. Figure 6 shows the
corresponding dynamics of actual inflation, output and government spending.
The ordering of curves from top down on the right is π, y and g. It is
seen that actual values of inflation and the output variables also converge
to their steady state values after initial fluctuations. We remark that the
time variable plotted here is notional time τ corresponding to the E-stability
diﬀerential equation. For constant gains the link to real time t depends on
the “gain” ω of the learning rule according to τ = ωt. Thus if ω = 0.10 per
quarter then τ = 2 corresponds to t = 20 quarters.
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Figure 5: Inflation, output, and net output expectations over time
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Figure 6: Time paths of actual inflation, output, and government spending
It evident that there is convergence to the unique steady state and this
result appears to be robust numerically. Thus, this policy appears to pro-
vide a robust way to avoid a liquidity trap and the associated deflationary
dynamics that arise with learning under the basic interest rate policy. The
mechanism is that by stabilizing prices through expansionary government
spending, low nominal interest rates yield low expected real interest rates,
which leads to a recovery of private spending.
While our recommended policy does successfully insulate the economy
from the deflation trap, the resulting path is cyclical and exhibits overshoot-
ing of the inflation target after the economy is pushed out of the deflationary
region. There are big fluctuations in inflation, output and government spend-
ing in the initial stages of the dynamics, a feature that was not seen in the
short-horizon learning examined in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008).
The reason for the large fluctuations is as follows. The combined monetary
and fiscal easing during the initial period of pessimistic expectations leads to
high levels of government spending and output, which in turn substantially
increases ye. When the initial period of easing ends at around τ = 0.1, πe is
near the threshold value π˜1, but ye is above the value corresponding to the
targeted steady state. For a period of time gt remains at the normal value g¯
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and Figure 2 applies. It can be seen that the economy is in a region northwest
of the targeted steady state, implying that πe and ye increase. Eventually
the economy enters a region northeast of the π∗ steady state, with increasing
πe and decreasing ye. The next phase is in the region southeast of the π∗
steady state, with decreasing πe and ye. This is followed by a phase in the
region southwest of the π∗ steady state, and a second time interval during
which aggressive fiscal policy is followed before gradual convergence to the
targeted steady state. This particular simulation shows that the cyclical ad-
justment path to the targeted steady state can entail more than one time
interval during which the thresholds for aggressive policy are binding.
These numerical results raise the question of whether alternative versions
of our combined policy of monetary and fiscal easing can insulate the econ-
omy from deflation traps with smaller fluctuations in output and inflation.
In Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) interest rates responded to current
rather than expected inflation, and it is possible this would improve per-
formance under infinite-horizon learning. One related issue to examine is
the performance of interest-rate rules that additionally depend on actual or
expected output (or net output). Based on the steady-state relationship be-
tween output and inflation, these more general Taylor rules are unlikely to
change the number of steady states, and hence will not eliminate deflation
traps, but they may improve the cyclical performance of the economy. Other
possible modifications of policy include fiscal responses that are smoother
and that respond countercyclically to high expected output and inflation,
and explicit commitments to temporary increases in government spending
with a suitable time profile.
The time-path of public debt is an important feature not shown in Fig-
ures 5 and 6. The large increases in government spending in the early periods
obviously lead to a substantial increase in public debt. However, because gt
eventually converges to g¯ and because the tax rule (5) is passive in the sense
of Leeper (1991), the debt level eventually returns to the normal steady state
value. In the case of Euler equation learning this was illustrated in the nu-
merical simulations of Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008). An implication
of the result that the debt level stabilizes in the long run is that the transver-
sality condition holds ex post as well as ex ante.
Noting the critical role of fiscal policy in stabilizing inflation, one might
ask whether we could dispense entirely with aggressive monetary policy and
simply resort to aggressive fiscal policy whenever πt threatens to fall be-
low π˜1? While the answer is yes, we think our combined policy is clearly
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preferable because there are good reasons to treat monetary policy as the
primary tool for counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy. If extensive govern-
ment spending is used guarantee the inflation threshold, then it is likely that
much of the spending will be wasteful in the sense that private consumption
would be more highly valued. We therefore prefer to use fiscal policy as a
policy of last resort to ensure the inflation threshold.
5 Conclusions
When monetary policy is conducted using a standard Taylor rule, the in-
tended steady state is locally stable under learning. However, the economy
is not globally stable under learning, and this remains true even if agents
make decisions based on infinite-horizon optimization problems. A large
exogenous negative shock to expectations can lead to a deflation trap in
which expected deflation and low output is reinforced under learning and the
economy fails to return to the intended equilibrium. Deflation traps can be
avoided by a policy of aggressive monetary and fiscal easing if inflation falls
below a suitable threshold, such as zero net inflation. Interestingly, current
monetary and fiscal policies to combat the ongoing global economic crisis are
qualitatively in line with the aggressive policies discussed in this paper.
The policy of combined monetary and fiscal easing is eﬀective in avoiding
deflation even though households are assumed to make consumption deci-
sions using a perceived life-time budget constraint that incorporates Ricar-
dian equivalence. Although our suggested policy successfully insulates the
economy against deflation traps, in some cases there are substantial fluctua-
tions in output and inflation along the transition back to the intended steady
state. As briefly discussed above, finding simple policies that reduce the fluc-
tuations in output and inflation, during this transition, is a high priority for
future research.
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